



TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONg AS AFFECTED BY THE
RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Piaisantej ustice qu'une rivire out un montagne borne.-PASCAL.
SECT. I. INTRODUCTORY.
MUNICIPAL laws cannot proypiore vigore have any extra-terri-
torial bearing or effect. This limitation of their scope leaves two
classes of cases unprovided for: First, cases arising between states
having no common superior ; secondly, cases where the subjects of
one state have rights or obligations which are questioned or im-
paired in another. The first class of cass is settled by the Public
International Law, a set of rules emanating from common agree-
ment in practice, or the original compacts of states. And to deter-
mine before the courts of what state a case of the second class is to
be heard, and by the law of what state determined, is the special
province of International Private Law. This system consists of
rules of interstate comity, affecting to regulate the rights and acts
of persons as depending on a diversity of laws and jurisdictions.
It acknowledges the binding force of municipal laws, and its
problem is to ascertain the principles on which such laws, as such,
are binding between members of different states; and to determine
which municipal law is, by those principles, to be applied in a par-
ticular case: Westlake, -Priv. Int. Law, ch. 11. If a decedent,
domiciled in one state, has. left a will disposing of personalty at
home, and realty situate in a foreign or sister state, questions may
arise as to his capacity, the solemnities of the execution of the will,
or the validity of its dispositions; and when such questions do arise
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a problem of practical difficulty .is presented : where and- how are
they to be determined ? When, therefore, a set of facts has to be
regulated in accordance with law, two questions of capital import-
ance are at once presented for solution: First, what state has jaris-
diction to apply the law ? And, secondly, what law will it apply?
The former of these questions is said to relate to the properforum;
the latter to the appropriate lex: Holland, Jurisprudence 305.
We will now consider these in order.
SECT. IL THE PROPER FORUM.
A. CASES RELATING TO PERSONALTY.
As a general rule, the court of the domicile is the proper forum
in which to raise questions in wills of personalty, even though the
property be situate in another state: Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me.
165. The court of the domicile, it is said, is the forum coneursus
to which the legatees under a will of a testator or the persons enti-
tled to the distribution of an estate of an intestate are bound to
resort: Bnohin v. TWylie, 10 H. L. Cas. 1. The apparent violation
of sovereignty implied in the action of one state assuming to regu-
iate the disposition of property in another, is eliminated by the
fiction mobilia sequuntur personam; by which, though the mova-
bles are in point of fact within the territory of a different state, yet
in contemplation of law they are considered as having followed him
to the place of his last domicile. The general rule is, however,
subject to the limitation that, for certain purposes, the forum rei
siton may also take cognisance of the will ; as, for example, to con-
strue the will for the direction of ancillary administrators: Par8ons
v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103; or to try the validity of foreign bequests,
where the title to the bequeathed property is claimed by a citizen
of a foreign state: Burbank v. Payne, 17 La. Ann. 15. Upon the
death of a person leaving property in two or more- states or coun-
tries, his property in each is considered a separate succession for
the purposes of administration, the payment of debts, and the deci-
sion of claims of parties asserting title to the property. So Lord
KAMES: "In a legal view, a movable situated within a certain
territory is subjected to the judge of that territory ; and every
action claiming the property or possession of it must be brought
before that judge, as no other judge has authority over it:" Kames,
Principles of Equity, B. 8, c. 8, sect. 3. We have, therefore, the
fiction that the domicile draws to it the personal estate wherever it
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may chance to be; but the fiction yields whenever, for the pur-
poses of justice, the actual situs of the property should be exam-
ined: Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139.
B. CASES RELATING TO REALTY.
The exclusive right of the sovereign to command within its own
territory, and the intimate relation which feudalism established
between the sovereignty of the territory and the lordships of the
soil, furnish the basis for the exclusive claim of the courts of the
locus rei sitce to entertain suits respecting the realty. The rights
of the ownership of land receive the protection of the state where
the land lies, and of no other; and the protection of these rights
draws with it the just claim to regulate them. Moreover, no state,
by its laws, can affect to regulate the rights respecting immovables
in another state, since it cannot enforce its own decree without,a
violation of the foreign territorial sovereignty. These two grounds
concur to sustain in reason the claim of the courts of the situs.
An incidental eflect of this rule is, that it becomes necessary for
an executor of a decedent, who has left land in two or more states,
to take out letters in each state. For by taking out letters in one
state, he becomes an 6fficer of its courts, and as such, cannot sue
(Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Oh. 153; Noonan v. Bradley, 9
Wall. 394), or be sued (Vaughan v. _Northup, 15 Pet. 2; 0aldwell
v. Harding, 5 Blatch. 50), in another state without becoming an
officer of its courts also.
There is, however, an exception to the general rule that the
forum rei sitw possesses exclusive jurisdiction when the judgment
of a foreign court would act in yersonam, as e. g., in an action of
spec'fic performance against a foreign executor found within the
jurisdiction. The process, in such case, would operate against
him alone, and in no wise affect the foreign state: Massie v. Watts,
6 Cranch. 148.
SECT. IlL THE APPROPRIATE LEX.
A. CASES RELATING TO PERSONALTY.
1. As to Testamentary .Dapaciy.-The modern Roman law and
the common law, divergent vs they often are in questions of the
conflict of laws, agree in the rule that the law of the actual domicile
of the testator at the time of his death, governs on the point of his
legal capacity to make a will: Savigny Pr. Int. Law 137; Schultz
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v. Dambman, 3 Bradf. 379; Oath. Roberts's Will, 8 Paige Ch.
525 ; Whart. Confl. of Laws, sect. 570. If, therefore, the age of
capacity differs in two states, and an individual makes a will valid
by the laws of one, and subsequently acquiring a domicile in the
other, dies before reaching the testamentary age according to
that law, he would die intestate. The Tule that he must be of tes-
tamentary age by the law of the domicile at the time of his death
is inflexible: the rule locus regit actum cannot modify it: Fcelix,
Droit International Privd. So, also, if a married woman is inca-
pacitated to make a will by the law of her domicile at the time of
her death, it will avail nothing that she made a will in a former
domicile where she had such capacity: Story Confl. of Laws, sect.
70. Likewise, in our practice the jurisdiction in which wills of
movables are litigated on the issue of sanity, is that of the dece-
dent's last domicile; and the questionis, whether by the law of that
domicile the testator had a disposing mind: Whart. Confl. of Laws,
sect. 574. And when the courts of the forum situs claim to decide
the question of domicile (usual practice), they do not depart from
the principle, but show that they hold it inviolable.
The stringency of the common-law rule in this regard has been
departed from in England (24 & 25 Vict. c. 107), and many of our
states (e. g., New York, Code Civ. Proc., sect. 2612), so that now
no change of domicile, under the laws- of such states, avoids or
affects a will, valid by the law of the domicile at the time of its
execution: Whart. Confl. of Laws, sect. 570.
2. As to Forms and Solemnities of -Execution.-On the question
what law shall determine the validity of the execution of a will,
there is a conflict between the jurisprudence of the continent and
the common law of England. The former allows an option of con-
formity to the lex loci actus, or the lex domicilii, on the ground,
according to Savigny, that" the object of law is to favor and facilitate,
not to thwart the act of the party :" XXXVIII., sect. 381. Early
opinion on the continent, however, was in favor of the lex domicilii
governing. Vattel lays down the rule that the validity of a testa-
ment, as to its form, can only be decided by the judge of the domi-
cile, whose sentence ought to be everywhere acknowledged: Law
of Nations, . 2, sect. 85. The common law of England accords
with the earlier continental view; and is rigorous in the require-
ment that the forms and solemnities required by the law of the
domicile at the testator's death be complied with : Stanley v.
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Bernes, 3 Hagg. 374; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Story 755; Whicker
v. Hume, 7 I. L. Cas. 124; aroker v. farquis of Hertford, 4
Moore Priv. Coucil Rep. 839; 10 Id. 361. Accordingly a
will made in one state in compliance with the formalities there
required, by one who subsequently becomes domiciled and dies in
another state, is not valid unless conformable to the formalities
prescribed by the latter state: the reason being that the will is not
a completed act until the testator dies, and as he does not die
abroad no principle of comity enters into the case: Moultrie v.
Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394. And a will invalid by the law of the last
domicile will not pass personalty in a foreign country, although exe-
cuted with all the formality required by the local laws: Desesbats
v. Berquier, 1 Binn. (Penna.) 336.
The rule as to formal execution of wills has also been abrogated
in England and many of our states (24 & 25 Vict., c. 107), and the
option of the modern Roman law permitted: Irwin's Appeal, 33
Conn. 128; N. Y. Code Civ. Froc., sect. 2612.
3. As to Validity of -Dispositions.-Although there be a differ-
ence in the law as between the place of the last domicile, and the
place where the movables are situate, still, if there be no positive
law prohibiting the disposition made, the law of the domicile always
governs: Gartand v. .Rowan, 2 Sm. & M. 617; N. Y. Code Civ.
Proc., sect. 2694. The reason of this, in the language of Chief
Justice ABBOTT, "is not that the law of England gives way to the
law of the foreign country ; but that it is a part of the law of Eng-
land that personal property should be disposed of according to jus
domicili :" Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 5 B. & C. 438. When, how-
ever, the law of the domicile comes in conflict with an express stat-
ute of another jurisdiction, it loses its binding force : Harper v.
Stanbrough, 2 La. Ann. 377. It is a maxim that the law of comity
cannot prevail in any case where it violates the law of our country,
the law of nature, or the law of God: BEST, J., in Forbes v. Coch-
rane, 2 B. & C. 448. For it is the attribute of every government,
as a necessary result of its sovereignty, to establish such modifica-
tions of the right of property in things within its jurisdiction, as
the public interest and 'the policy of its laws require. Indeed, an
explicit interdiction is not necessary to prevent the operation of the
rule of the lex donzicilii. It has been held that the interdiction may
result from general laws declaring public policy, as well as special
laws covering the precise point : Alahorner v. Ilooe, 9 Sm. & 2. 247.
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This condition of the law leads to the remark that testamentary
bequests often have to comply with the laws of two states. For if
a will, by the law of the domicile, have all the forms and requisites
to pass title to personalty, the validity of particular bequests may
still depend on conformity with the law of the domicile of the legatee:
Chamberlain v. Chamberlazn, 48 N. Y. 483. So it was expressly
decided that a bequest by a citizen of this state to a charity to be
administered in a sister state, although lawful by the law of the
state, the domicile of the testator, was invalid for non-compliance
with the laws of the state where the fund was to be administered:
Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327.
4. As to Construction.-Where a person has several residences
and makes a will disposing of his personal estate, the law presumes
that the will was made with reference to the law of his domicile: and
wherever such will becomes the subject of legal inquiry, that is the
law to be applied in its legal interpretation and construction : Trot-
ter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh. (N. S.) 502; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N.
Y. 103; see Code Civ. Proc., sects. 2612, 2694. Where a testator
domiciled in England made a will in Scotland, disposing of mova-
bles, Lord BROUGHAM said: "His written declarations must * * *
be taken with respect to the English law. I think it follows fiom
hence, that these declarations of intention touching that property
must be construed (by the Scotch court) as we should construe them
here, by our principles of legal interpretation :" Yates v. Thomson,
8 Cl. & Fin. 544. So where movables are bequeathed to a tes-
tator's "heir at law," it is presumed the testator intended him who
is heir by the law of domicile: Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 488. And
where a lady domiciled in England, resided for a long period in
Scotland, and there made a will bequeathing an absolute interest in
her personal property, the legatee having died in her lifetime, it
was held that the law of England governed the construction, and
that by that law her representatives, and not those of the legatee,
were entitled; though by the law of Scotland the interest does not
lapse by the death of the legatee: Anstruther v. Chalmers, 2 Sim.
.1. The same rule was subsequently followed in the House of Lords,
in a case where a testator domiciled in Russia, made a will in the
Russian language, disposing of certain -personal property in Eng-
land. The will was construed, in the latter country, in accordance
with the law of Russia: Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. Cas. 1.
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B. CASES RELATING To REALTY.
It is the common and received opinion, with respect to immova-
bles, that the law of the place where they are situate is to govern
in their transfer and devolution. Communis et recta sententia est,
in rebus immobilibus, servandum esse fus loci in quo bona sunt site:
Huberus, de Confi., Leg. I., liber 3, fit. 13. This principle is doubt-
less to be attributed to the feudal system, and is adhered to more
rigidly in England and America than in continental Europe. It.
may be stated generally that the lex situs is to be applied to deter-
mine the character of the property : Fcelix, Droit Int. Priv6,. No.
60, n, the rights of which, the diverse kinds may be the subject,
and the persons to be admitted to the enjoyment of these rights:
N'ewlands,v. Chalmers's Trustees, 11 Sh. & Duni., Ses. Cas. 65.
And it must be further consulted respecting the modes which, with
due regard to the public interest, this law has provided for the
acquisition, protection and transmission of these rights: Beatar v.
Smith, 3 Knapp 143. For convenience, the same classification
may be made as in the rules relating to personalty.
1. As to Testamentary Capacity.-The real statute in regard to
capacity to devise, is. in the common law, applied with the utmost
rigor. If a person is incapable by the lex rei sitcw of transferring
his real estate, any will of it made by him will be invalid, though
by the law of his domicile or by the law of the place where the act
is done, no such incapacity exists: IV. Phil. Int. Law 448; N. Y.
Civ. Proc., sects. 2612, 2694. This, however, is not the uniform
opinion of the continental jurists. Those authorities are about
equally divided between this principle and the rule that the law of
the domicile should govern, with the great names of Grotius, of
Savigny and of Fcelix, in favor of the latter view: Wharton Confd.
Laws, sect 570, n. 3. But the first principle is acted upon with
great unanimity in this country. See .Eyre v. Storer, 37 N. H.
121.
2. As to Forms and Solemnities of .Execution.-As the disposi-
tion of real property is exclusively subject to the law of the state
where it is situate, it is the sole privilege of that law to prescribe
the form of instrument by which the title may be transferred: Me-
Cormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., sects.
2612, 2694. This branch of the general rule was laid down in an
early case, where a will was made beyond sea, which did not con-
form to the formalities of the English law. The court said: "The
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will, as to the land, must be void; and it makes no difference that
the will was made beyond sea, the same being lands in England,
which if they pass by will, must pass by such a will and so circum-
stanced and attested as the laws of England require :" C&ppin v.
0oTpin, 2 P. Wins. 293; Doe v. Pickett, 51 Ala. 584. Following
this principle, it has been held that where a local statute provided
that no foreign will should affect real estate unless filed in the county
where the land lay, the requirement of the statute must be strictly
complied with, or the -will would be inoperative as to such land:
Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565. It may therefore happen that a
will would fail to pass really in a foreign jurisdiction, by reason of
non-compliance with the formalities prescribed by the lex rei site,
and yet be valid to pass personalty there ; compliance with the law
of the domicile being sufficient for that purpose: Potter v. Titcomb,
22 Me. 303. And conversely, a will-void for informality, by the
law of the domicile, or where made, may yet be effectual to pass title
to real property in another state, by reason of its due execution
aeeording to the solemnities there required; though it would be
invalid as to personalty there also: Holman v. RUoykins, 27 Tex.
39.
A question as to leaseholds arises at this point. Are they to be
governed by the law of the owner's last domicile, or the law of the
place where the land lies? In the Romani law and systems derived
from it, they are governed by the same law as the land, being
included in the term immovables. And this is the rule in England;
.Freke v. Lord Qarbery, L. R., 16 Eq. 466. In New York, how-
ever, a leasehold, for this purpose, as well as for others, is consid-
ered to be personal property, and is allowed to pass by a will not
within the requirements of the Revised Statutes, provided it be
valid by the law of the last domicile: Despard v. Churchill, 53 N.
Y. 192; the rule would now be this way under sects. 2611, 2612,
Code Civ. Proc.
3. As to TFalidity of DhTostion.-On this point there is
no conflict. It is universally' agreed that the lex tei site is to
-prevail not only in the matter of the transfer of lands, but also
as to the nature, extent and purpose of the dispositions: White
v. Howard, 52 Barb. S06 ; s. c. 46 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., sect.
2694. Accordingly, in a state where the birth of a posthumous
child operates to fiullify a will, a testator domiciled elsewhere
cannot dispose of .property .to the disinheritance of a child born
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after his death: Eyre v. Stover, 37 N. R1. 114. Although pro-
perly executed by the law of the domicile, and effective to pass
real estate there, the birth of a posthumous child would operate- as
an abatement of all devises of property situated in the foreign state:
Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 111. 337. So, also, where a foreign
testator devises real estate, situate here, to certain charitable uses,
it becomes incumbent on the courts of this state to determine, not
only the validity of the dispositions, but also the capacity of the
charitable bodies to take the property intended for them: White v.
Howard, 52 Barb. 306. And where a legacy is left a wife in lieu
of dower in foreign lands, and she refuses the legacy and claims
her dower, the dower is to be admeasured according to the law of
the state where the lands lie: Bolton v. Sigler, 29 Ark. 426. The
question whether dower extends to all the lands of which the hus-
band was at any time seised, or simply to those of which he died
seised, is likewise determined by the same law: Id
4. As to the Construction.---It has been said that the law of the
last domicile is to furnish the rule of construction of wills, as well of
realty as of personalty, unless it clearly appears from the terms of
the will that the testator had in mind the law of the foreign juris-
diction: Story Confi. Laws, sect. 479 h. But notwithstanding the
great authority of the writer who so states it, the rule as thus laid
down is not borne out by the cases, and is undoubtedly opposed to
the analogies of the law in this regard: Whart. Confi. Laws, sect.
597. As early as 1682, the courts of England refused to construe
a will made in Dutch, and disposing of land in England, according
to the law of Holland: Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 85. The court
said: " As to what was objected that in Dutch they never use the
word 'heir,' that signifies nothing; for a will that concerns land in
England must be so framed as by the law of this realm is required
for the passing of estates, as hath been several times resolved in
cases of Latin wills and the like": Id. And the courts of this
country are equally explicit: Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56.
Where the question was whether equitable conversion of lands here
situate had taken place by the terms of a foreigner's will, the judge
said : "It is for the courts of New York, as to the real estate in
New York, to construe the will," and to construe it by our law:
White v. Howard, 52 Barb. 306. Also where the question was
whether after-acquired realty passed by a general devise of land
"wherever situate," it was held that the judge of the situs apply-
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